
Roundtable on Living Neoliberalism: Negotiating Markets and Morality Outside the West

A Just Economy? Unifying and Dividing the Islamic Intellectual Field in Neoliberal Turkey

Gizem Zencirci*

In this paper, I argue that the relationship between religion and neoliberalism in non-Western contexts cannot be understood without paying attention to the contested, dynamic, and fluid production of local knowledge. In order to substantiate this argument, I trace debates about development, equality, class, labor, and wealth that circulate in the Islamic intellectual field in Turkey. Specifically, I analyze the viewpoints of three contemporary Turkish Muslim intellectuals who make different claims about Islam's economic teachings. Mustafa Özel proposes "entrepreneurial Islam" as an alternative to state-regulated capitalism, Ihsan Eliaçık argues that "social Islam" ordains Muslims to redistribute wealth, whereas Lütfi Bergen suggests that "pastoral Islam" precedes Western capitalist modernity. I find that the disputed notion of a just economy is what unifies and divides this intellectual field as a constitutive question that is disagreed upon. This article thus calls for a recognition of the contingency, multiplicity, and indeterminacy of Islamic-neoliberal assemblages.

*Gizem Zencirci, Department of Political Science, Providence College, 1 Cunningham Square, Providence, RI 02908, USA. Email: fzencirc@providence.edu. I thank the editors of this special issue, Kirsten Wesselhoeft and Deonnie Moodie, and the editor and reviewers at the *Journal of the American Academy of Religion* for a remarkably constructive editorial and review process. I also would like to thank Alev Çınar, Talha Köseoğlu, Halil Ibrahim Yenigün, and participants at the Political Thought in Turkey Workshop for their helpful comments. Lastly, I thank Patrick Shea for his valuable research support.

Journal of the American Academy of Religion, September 2021, Vol. 89, No. 3, pp. 1–862
<https://doi.org/10.1093/jaarel/lfab078>

© The Author(s) 2021. Published by Oxford University Press on behalf of the American Academy of Religion. All rights reserved. For permissions, please e-mail: journals.permissions@oup.com.

IN 2006, *The New York Times* published an article titled “Turks Knock on Europe’s Door with Evidence that Islam and Capitalism Can Co-Exist” (Bilefsky 2006). Summarizing the findings of a controversial report published by the European Stability Initiative on what was referred to as Islamic Calvinism, this article examined the growth of the Islamic business sector in various Anatolian cities and discussed how the rise of the Muslim bourgeoisie contributed to the electoral success of the Islamic-conservative Justice and Development Party (*Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi*, AKP). Excerpts from interviews conducted with a number of Muslim businessmen from Kayseri—one of the leading centers of Islamic business in Turkey—were selected to demonstrate the seamless blending of Islamic values and free markets. Some of these individuals emphasized Islam’s “entrepreneurial spirit.” Others traced the region’s commercial success to the moral teachings of Prophet Muhammad. Yet another group highlighted the ways in which international trade transformed their own understanding of Islamic piety. The article concluded by briefly discussing AKP’s positive impact. By combining democratic conservatism, free-market ideals, and Islamic values, the AKP had created a conducive environment for Muslim entrepreneurs to succeed in business endeavors and actively participate in political affairs (“Islamic Calvinists: Change and Conservatism in Central Anatolia” 2005).

Perhaps not surprisingly, the European Stability Initiative report generated a heated debate among Muslim commentators, scholars, and journalists in Turkey. On the one hand were those who questioned the presumed Western origins of capitalism. Using a pro-Western tone, one commentator argued that there was nothing newsworthy about “Islamic Calvinism” because Muslims, he argued, had always been supportive of economic liberalism (Akyol 2006). Other intellectuals, taking anti-Westernism as a departure point, suggested that the source of Anatolia’s current economic vitality stemmed from indigenous Islamic traditions and thus could not be examined by using theories drawn from European experiences such as Calvinism or Protestantism (Bulaç 2006). On the other hand were those skeptical of the integration of religious beliefs and neoliberal ethics. Some authors were concerned with the growing trend towards “exploitation of religious communities by the capitalist system” and called for developing a posture of “ethical resistance” (Uzun 2006). Others warned that the project of “liberal Islam” had culminated in the formation of a Muslim bourgeoisie class, thereby transforming Turkish Islamism into a depoliticized movement no longer capable of opposing or resisting the state (Altun 2006).

This example highlights that the relationship between Islam and neoliberalism is a highly contested issue among Muslim intellectuals in Turkey. In this article, I examine the contours of this debate to shed light on the relationship between religion and neoliberalism in non-Western contexts. Several interrelated questions guide my analysis: How do contemporary Muslim intellectuals interpret the economic teachings of Islam? In what ways do they understand the relationship between faith, prosperity, and responsibility towards those who are less fortunate? And what, if anything, do they recommend should be done with regard to social stratification and economic inequality?

To address these questions, I examine the perspectives of three contemporary Muslim intellectuals: Mustafa Özel, Ihsan Eliaçık, and Lütfi Bergen. When it comes to debates about the economy, I find that the notion of justice (*adalet*) is what unifies and divides the Islamic intellectual field in Turkey. Although most Muslim intellectuals disagree about the meaning and purpose of justice, all of them invoke alternate notions of the “just economy”¹ when discussing matters such as business, commerce, trade, and production from an Islamic standpoint. In addition to underlining the diversity of Islamic economic thought in Turkey, this argument also highlights that the relationship between religion and neoliberalism requires analyzing on-the-ground practices of knowledge production instead of relying on essentialist readings of the “Islamic economy.”

Several reasons have informed the selection of these intellectual figures. First, they are prominent members of the Islamic intellectual field who primarily, but not exclusively, work on the relationship between religion and the economy. Since the 1990s, each has published numerous articles and books; given public talks at NGOs, universities, think-tanks, and television programs; and played an active role in Islamic civic, economic, political, and intellectual networks. In addition to working on questions of civil society, democracy, nationalism, and secularism, they have also written extensively on matters such as class, equality, poverty, and wealth from an Islamic standpoint. Second, although they belong to the same intellectual field, they differ in terms of their claims concerning the economic principles of Islam; their approach to social stratification, wealth accumulation, and religious devotion; and their conceptualization of Islamic justice. Third, and finally, a close reading of these three intellectuals’ religious interpretations and economic visions illustrates that not all

¹This article does not make any claims regarding what constitutes a truly “just economy” from an Islamic standpoint. Rather, I examine what kinds of religious and economic practices are being considered to constitute a “just economy” by these intellectuals, thereby demonstrating the ways in which the concept of justice is central for understanding the relationship between Islam and neoliberalism.

Muslim intellectuals in Turkey agree with the governing AKP's neoliberal-Islamic project. Whereas Mustafa Özel can be seen as one of the ideological architects of this project due to his unwavering support of the new Muslim bourgeoisie, both Eliaçık and Bergen have emerged as Muslim intellectuals who criticize the AKP government for privileging wealth generation over Islamic values.

Examining the contours of this multi-faceted debate thus provides a window into the contested and dynamic Islamic intellectual field in Turkey: Mustafa Özel proposes "entrepreneurial Islam" as an alternative to state-regulated capitalism, Ihsan Eliaçık argues that "social Islam" ordains Muslims to redistribute wealth, whereas Lütfi Bergen suggests that "pastoral Islam" opposes and precedes Western capitalist modernity. Yet, despite their divergent theoretical frameworks, each one of them reads the "economy" as a matter that pertains to the Islamic project of justice. Mustafa Özel's "entrepreneurial Islam" defines justice as a process of reaching fair prices through unregulated commerce and trade, Ihsan Eliaçık's "social Islam" claims that justice requires the redistribution of wealth between the haves and the have-nots, and Lütfi Bergen's "pastoral Islam" asserts that justice can only be achieved through the cultivation of moral personhood within a household-based economic structure.

This article contributes to this roundtable on religion and economy in non-Western contexts by bringing together the scholarship on "Islamic neoliberalism" with the burgeoning literature on new Muslim intellectuals. Departing from monolithic assessments that construe the "Islamic economy" as fundamentally incompatible with capitalism, a growing body of work examines the co-articulation of Islamic beliefs, values, and traditions with neoliberal dynamics, technologies, and rationalities. Be it the rise of a Sharia-inspired corporate culture in Malaysia (Sloane-White 2017), the transformation of charitable giving in Egypt and Turkey (Atia 2013; Tuğal 2017; Mittermaier 2014; Zencirci 2020), or changes in the Islamic finance sector in Indonesia and Jordan (Rudnycky 2018; Tobin 2016), these studies converge on the idea that Muslims increasingly understand and experience their faith in ways that augment processes of commodification, individualization, and privatization. Although Islamic idioms, symbols, and practices are being reconfigured alongside economic liberalization, what emerges through this co-articulation is not a monolithic, uniform, all-encompassing, singular "Islamic neoliberalism" but rather a plethora of religious experiences and economic orientations that are assembled in unexpected and often contradictory ways. These findings corroborate arguments put forth by critical studies that move beyond studying "neoliberalism as a thing that acts in the world" (Kingfisher

and Maskovsky 2008, 118) in favor of methodological and theoretical approaches that foreground diversity, fluidity, and indeterminacy (Hoffman et al., 2006; Higgins and Larner 2017; Brady and Lippert 2016). Taken together, these studies suggest that neoliberalism is neither an external event nor an ideological project, but rather a locally contested practice that unfolds on the ground.

Analyzing the contestation and negotiation of Islamic neoliberalism through the lens of new Muslim intellectuals draws attention to how they share similar repertoires of argumentation, modes of piety, and philosophical commitments. Many are modern, cosmopolitan thinkers who draw from Islamic scripture and Eastern philosophy as well as from the Western canon to address immediate concerns of Muslim-majority societies such as Egypt, Indonesia, Iran, Malaysia, and Pakistan (Kersten 2011; Taji-Farouki 2004; Khosrokhavar 2004). Instead of a blanket rejection or a wholehearted embrace of Western modernity, their intellectual projects break down boundaries and unsettle taken-for-granted dichotomies. They discuss and write about issues such as democracy, liberalism, modernity, human rights, and relations with the West through frameworks drawn from age-old philosophical traditions of Islam while at the same time, their intellectual efforts are marked by an attempt “to understand and to respond to capitalism, and above all to the moral freight of capitalism, from a self-consciously Islamic perspective” (Tripp 2006, 4). Their public persona often combines religious knowledge with new forms of media authority, and this combination, in turn, generates a broader sphere of influence (Aishima 2016).

Although this article concurs with the distinctiveness of new Muslim intellectuals, and the significance of their contributions, it shifts the focus a little bit by privileging the shared, fluid, and contested terrain of knowledge production. According to Bourdieu, an “intellectual field” is based on the principle that “the relationship between a creative artist and his work, and therefore his work itself is affected by the system of social relations within which creation as an act of communication takes place” (1969, 89). Intellectual fields consist of “systems of agents . . . which by their existence, opposition, or combination, determine its specific structure at a given moment of time” (Bourdieu 1969, 89). Building on this definition, I offer the term “Islamic intellectual field” to capture the complex set of philosophical currents, schools of thought, and “discursive traditions” (Asad 1986) that shape knowledge production in Muslim-majority contexts. In contrast to an analysis of individual figures or generational shifts, such an analytical framework allows an unpacking of the themes and concepts, limits, and norms as well as silences and disputes of the Islamic intellectual field without downplaying its fluidity and multiplicity.

Put differently, intellectuals are not just producers or transmitters of local knowledge, but are thinkers situated in larger political, economic, cultural, and intellectual milieus.

In addition to in-depth interviews conducted with two of these intellectuals in 2017, the following is based on a “thematic analysis” (Fugard and Potts 2019) of their corpus drawn from a database of these intellectuals’ published articles and books since the early 1990s.² The article opens by situating the rise and contours of the Islamic intellectual field within the Turkish political, economic, and historical context. The rest of the article maps how these Muslim intellectuals approach the relationship between Islam and the “economy” by examining their perspectives on questions of class, equality, poverty, and wealth. Demonstrating the similarities and differences between their perspectives as well as discussing some key points of erasure and dissonance allow not only for a better grasp of Islam as a discursive tradition but also highlight the global resonance of their economic visions.

SITUATING THE ISLAMIC INTELLECTUAL FIELD IN TURKEY

Several factors have contributed to the transformation of the Islamic intellectual field in Turkey: the legacy of state secularism, the adoption of a neoliberal economic program, and the rise and moderation of political Islam. This multi-layered intellectual field shaped and was shaped by the trajectory of Islamism in Turkey, particularly concerning the secularist-Islamist clash that marked the 1990s, the branding of Turkey as a “model Muslim democracy,” followed by AKP’s authoritarian reversal that has marked the past decade.

Although there has been a long history of Islamic thought in Turkey, the founding of the Turkish Republic in 1923 intensified the bifurcation of knowledge into Western and Islamic spheres—already a key feature of the late modern Ottoman intellectual scene. By demolishing Islamic schools (*madrasa*) and eradicating Islamic brotherhoods and communities, the new Turkish regime sought to restructure the impact of Islam on the country’s intellectual, political, and cultural life. These top-down reforms were undertaken in the name of modernization, secularization,

²This database is the product of a multi-year project on the Islamic intellectual field in Turkey, which involved identifying, collecting, archiving, and analyzing more than 100 journals, magazines, and other periodicals that have been published and circulated since the 1990s. Titled as “The Production, Dynamics and Key Concepts of Current Islamic Political Thought in Turkey: Civilization, Justice, and Order,” this project was funded by TUBITAK (The Scientific and Technological Research Council of Turkey)’s 1001 Grant Program (project number: 115K283, principal investigator: Alev Cinar).

and Westernization while attempting to decouple Islam from knowledge production. Yet, as revisionist accounts of Turkish political history have shown, the Turkish regime, albeit to differing degrees, selectively incorporated Islamic ideas, movements, and groups into the political regime (Turam 2007; Lord 2018). Hence, depending on the political atmosphere, Muslim-conservative intellectuals in Turkey experienced varying degrees of hospitality—sometimes being selectively welcomed into political and intellectual networks, other times facing exclusion or even imprisonment (Dorroll 2014; Aytürk and Mignon 2013).

Despite this complicated relationship, the rise of Muslim intellectuals in the post-1980 period has often been interpreted as a backlash against authoritarian secularism (Dagi 2004; Karasipahi 2009; Kentel 2005). Although the legacy of authoritarian secularism is certainly a contributing factor, the formation and transformation of the Islamic intellectual field is best understood by attending to the shifting political-economic context of Turkey since the 1980s, such as the adoption of liberal economic programs and the introduction of the Turkish-Islamic synthesis that redefined the parameters of Turkish national identity. It was during this period that Muslim intellectuals established themselves as critical figures and voiced their opposition by organizing reading groups, starting publishing houses, and printing new periodicals, magazines, and books (Çınar 2019a). During the 1990s, the growing influence of Muslim intellectuals contributed to the electoral success of the *Refah* (Welfare Party), which won municipal elections in 1994 and formed a short-lived coalition government with the *Doğru Yol Partisi* (True Path Party) that lasted from 1996 to 1997. After more than a decade of spirited debate concerning questions such as Islam, state power, secularism, and modernity, intellectual production was interrupted by the 1997 postmodern military coup. Alarmed by the increasing popularity of the Islamist movement, the Turkish state establishment interfered in civilian politics and dissolved the Welfare Party on the grounds of undermining the secular principles of the regime. In the aftermath of the February 28 process, most Islam-based civic, economic, political, and intellectual activities were demobilized, later regrouping during the leadership of the AKP after 2001–2002 with new ideological stances and political viewpoints (Tuğal 2009). Many Muslim intellectuals experienced this period (1997–2002) as one of “reflexivity and self-critique” (Yildiz 2006, 41); some toned down their criticism of Turkish secularism; others changed their minds about civil society, democracy, and modernity; while a sizeable portion embraced liberalization of the economy (Köseoğlu 2019; Sunar 2018). Meanwhile, after a decade of successfully combining a moderate ideology of Islamism

with neoliberal programs and democratization efforts, the AKP began to govern Turkey in an increasingly authoritarian fashion. Despite these tectonic shifts, and throughout political Islam's phases of growth, moderation, and turn to despotism, Muslim intellectuals' discussions about the economy always revolved around the question of justice.

ÖZEL'S ENTREPRENEURIAL ISLAM AND REVIVING THE COMPETITIVE SPIRIT OF MUHAMMAD'S TIME

Born in 1956, Mustafa Özel was trained as an economist and worked in the business sector for much of the 1980s. He was one of the founders of the influential The Foundation for Sciences and Arts (*Bilim ve Sanat Vakfı*) think-tank in 1986 and Independent Industrialists and Businessmen Association (*Müstakil Sanayici ve İşadamları Derneği*) in 1990. Both institutions played a key role in the rise of the new Muslim bourgeoisie during the 1990s, and the subsequent consolidation of power by the AKP. In addition to regularly publishing in the periodicals of these organizations such as *Divan* and *Çerçeve*, Mustafa Özel has written more than twenty books on topics such as religion, state power, capitalism, and Islamism. Although the recent falling out between Recep Tayyip Erdoğan and Ahmet Davutoğlu has diminished Mustafa Özel's standing among governmental authorities, he is still considered to be one of AKP's early ideologues (Dalacoura 2017). Today, in addition to holding various academic positions, Mustafa Özel continues to publish in popular and academic venues and is regularly invited to give speeches by NGOs, think tanks, and universities.

Throughout his intellectual career, Özel's mission has been to provide guidelines for Muslim business owners in Turkey. His primary concern is to ensure that pious Muslims engage in business in a profit-maximizing fashion instead of treating the pursuit of wealth as an "un-Islamic" activity. Özel suggests that contemporary Muslim businessmen can acquire not only moral but also commercial skills by a careful study of early Islamic society (Özel 1994). In a nutshell, he promotes a vision of entrepreneurial Islam and argues that the "economic structure of a Muslim society is one of minimum regulation and a free competitive atmosphere" (Özel 1994, 6). He maintains that the entrepreneurial essence of early Islam was corrupted in later historical periods due to religious ignorance, foreign influence, or sheer ineptitude. For instance, he argues that the "economic backwardness" of the Ottoman Empire was caused by neither Islamic institutions nor legal systems but rather by misguided attempts to reform the imperial economy in the name of Westernization and modernization

(Özel 2006). Similarly, he argues that the Turkish state establishment restricted economic enterprise by only supporting business leaders that adhered to the pro-Western ideology of statist developmentalism (Özel 2005). In addition, a peculiar combination of Western thought and Sufi mysticism led to a situation where Turkish Muslims have clung to a fundamental fallacy about Islam's economic teachings. Instead of appreciating Islam's entrepreneurial spirit, they have come to believe that a life of scarcity and poverty is superior in the eyes of Allah. As a corrective to this misconception, Özel argues: "Dedicated individuals can become affluent, and those who are affluent can become responsible members of society through practicing gratitude. And Allah will give riches and property to whomever is deemed worthy in whatever amount" (1994, 13).

Özel claims that both socialism and capitalism are deeply problematic because they fail to uphold the principle of justice (2002, 24–25). Although "no religion can provide an automatic solution to economic problems," Islam, due to the significance of ethical valences such as moderation, gratitude, and patience, can act as a universal guide for people even if they belong to different faiths (Özel 2019). He describes himself as a "spiritual leftist" (as opposed to a "material leftist")—an ideological position that he defines as having an anti-establishment stance instead of a firm commitment to Marxism, socialism, or communism (Özel 2010a). Despite his commitment to free enterprise, he also repudiates modern capitalism. He argues: "Today's capitalism is not really a 'free market system,' rather it is a structure that has integrated political power with business interests through a high degree of monopolization" (Özel 2002, 25). Most problems that are attributed to free enterprise are in fact caused by capitalism's excessive reliance on regulation and lack of a communitarian ethos (Özel 2002, 25).

In addition to drawing from the Qur'anic text and the Sunnah, Özel substantiates his claims through discussing the nature of economic life during the Prophet's time. In doing so, Özel pits his vision of a "just economy" conceptually against a pre-Islamic Arabian society (*al-Jahiliyah, cahiliye dönemi*), which he argues was one that operated according to a monopolistic arrangement of commerce. Fortunately, Prophet Muhammad was able to institute the Medina bazaar in a manner that prevented the formation of cartels and encouraged entrepreneurship:

The Medina bazaar brought an end to the exclusion of entrepreneurs by economic monopolies. The prophet, for example, constructed the Medina bazaar on a flat surface. The selection of this location illustrates the importance of transparency. There was no room for "asymmetric access to information" in the Muslim bazaar. For prices to be freely determined

by the market, actors needed to be able to have equal access to information. The most important distinction between modern capitalism and a real market economy is the fact that contemporary economic systems are often defined by asymmetric access to information. (Özel 2010b)

For Özel then, Islam prescribes a free market atmosphere as corroborated by his interpretation of early Islamic economics and polity. In this view, the Medina bazaar emerges as a model of vibrant commercial activity where merchants were free to produce, sell, and purchase goods; political authorities refrained from interfering in economic activities; prices were set by the market; and each member of society was able to pursue their own interests while being considerate of those in their vicinity (Özel 1996a, 40–41). Elsewhere, Özel emphasizes that the rising Muslim bourgeoisie's demands for less state intervention is in accordance with Islamic principles and draws parallels between the Medina bazaar and *Müstakil Sanayici ve İşadamları Derneği* (2010b). Whereas the Medina bazaar rehabilitated a pre-Islamic commercial structure by removing barriers that inhibited economic freedom, neoliberal reforms that were introduced during the 1980s liberated Muslim businesspeople from the institutional and ideological constraints of state developmentalism, thereby prompting the resurgence of Islamic entrepreneurialism.

Özel's emphasis on "entrepreneurial Islam" also shaped his understanding of justice and, by extension, his approach to questions of social stratification and economic difference. One of the ways in which Özel discusses justice is through the notion of "fair pricing." For example, Özel writes that the Prophet, in response to questions about what to do concerning the climbing prices of goods in the Medina bazaar, said: "Allah is the one that determines how much things should cost" (1996b, 154). Allah's ultimate wisdom regulates markets, and Muslims must submit to this all-knowing power. This interpretation suggests that governmental intervention into economic affairs is un-Islamic. Through deploying a similar logic, Özel also disapproves of the public provision of social services. In his view, a just economy is one that combines free enterprise with a voluntary culture of almsgiving, thereby balancing individual interest with social solidarity in a way that lessens the need for governmental intervention.

While discussing the notion of a just economy, Özel also distinguishes between permissible and forbidden kinds of wealth acquisition. Far from hindering profit and wealth, he argues that Islam ordains its believers to be successful businesspeople who engage in commercial activities within an evenhanded framework. But the pursuit of a just economy should not come at the expense of competition and innovation. In contrast to Muslim scholars who encourage moderation and frugality, Özel asserts that it is

human nature to “desire possessions that exceeds one’s immediate need” (1994, 7). For this reason, although Islam permits excess prosperity as long as the wealthy adopt a gratuitous attitude, it bans the exploitation of large segments of society (Özel 1994, 7–8). His reflections about business-labor relations and workers’ rights correspond to such an understanding of justice. For example, he suggests that the tendency of Muslim business owners towards providing their workers with higher wages is un-Islamic because “such generous raises will impact the cost of business, increase prices, and will result in the destruction of that business” (Özel 1993, 35). This recommendation to consider their profit margins before raising workers’ wages captures that for Özel, a just economy, first and foremost, serves the interests of the business sector.

In short, Özel affirms the universality of the profit-maximizing, competitive, entrepreneurial individual that underpins neoliberalism while refusing the Western origins of the free market. He develops this perspective by equating the Medina bazaar with free enterprise, thereby legitimizing a self-regulating economic system that has minimum governmental intervention.

ELİAÇIK’S SOCIAL ISLAM AND REVIVING THE QU’RAN’S REDISTRIBUTIVE ETHOS

Born in 1961 in Kayseri, Ihsan Eliaçık has been trained as a theologian and has been involved with Islam-based movements in Turkey since his youth. He has published a few influential books, including *Islam and Social Change* (1992), *Revolutionary Islam* (1995), *Social Islam: Redistribution is the Pillar of Religion* (2006), and, most recently, *The Justice State: The Sovereignty of the Common Good* (2015). Eliaçık has also played a pioneering role in the publication of numerous Islamic journals such as *Change* (*Değişim*, 1993–1998) and *Information and Thought* (*Bilgi ve Düşünce*, 2002–2003) and the Labor and Justice platform (*Emek ve Adalet Platformu*, 2011), among others. In addition to his intellectual work, Eliaçık is also actively involved in protest movements, often working together with activists, intellectuals, and groups from Islamic circles as well as across the political spectrum.

While Özel was responding to the late 1990s and early 2000s when the Islamic bourgeoisie was rising and this new political-economic elite was gaining control for the first time, Eliaçık, on the other hand, was responding to the last decade of AKP’s consolidation of power, its authoritarian turn, and, more specifically, to the swift accumulation of wealth among his compatriots. Although his intellectual career and activism

span more than four decades, Eliaçık's ideas matter in Turkey because he mobilized a youth group in opposition to the AKP and suffered the consequences of activism. He was one of the leading figures of the "Anti-Capitalist Muslims" (*Antikapitalist Müslümanlar*) coalition—part of a diverse group of individuals who came together to protest the demolition of a public park in Istanbul. During the summer of 2013, AKP's urban reconstruction plan that sought to replace the urban center with a neo-Ottoman style shopping mall led to a weeks-long confrontation between demonstrators and the Turkish government (Çınar 2019b; Arat 2013). Throughout these Gezi Park protests, anti-capitalist Muslims emerged as one of the few activist groups who criticized the government from an Islamic standpoint while advocating for a pro-poor coalition that cut across the secular-Islamic divide in Turkey (Koca 2018; Uestebay 2019).

During our interview, Eliaçık explained that he became vocal in his criticism of the AKP government after AKP's candidate, Abdullah Gül, was elected as the president (in 2007) after a long-standing confrontation with the secular state establishment:

We noticed a new development. Previously, in our movement, most of our discussions revolved around intellectual questions. . . . There were heightened debates about Islam, shariah, justice, government. But then it was almost as if thought disappeared. The main issue became capitalism. One day I looked around and noticed that most of my friends and acquaintances were driving expensive Jeeps, relocating to rich neighborhoods, buying villas. All were consumed with greed. I became suspicious, I stayed away. Was this it? Whatever happened to our vision of justice?³

Once Eliaçık began voicing his concerns in Islamic circles, he realized that many were unsatisfied with the AKP government. Echoing Iranian intellectual Ali Shariati's anti-capitalist reading of Islam, he began to write about the rise of "abluted capitalism" (*abdestli kapitalizm*) in Turkey. Refusing the celebrated fusion between Islamic values and market ethics, Eliaçık cautioned against the adoption of capitalist ways of thinking and being among pious Muslims. He equates AKP's political cadre to the Quranic figure of the Pharaoh—a "bad administrator" with a "tendency towards authoritarianism and totalitarianism," and one who rules by dividing society into different classes (Eliaçık 2011b, 16). According to Eliaçık, AKP's political regime does not uphold an Islamic notion of justice (2011a). What defines such a form of governance, among other

³ Author's interview with İhsan Eliaçık, August 2, 2017, Istanbul.

things, is the fact that leaders are just and moral and they are freely chosen by society, and that society has a right to fight against unjust and despotic rulers (Eliaçık 1998).

In his view, most works of Qur'anic exegesis interpret verses about assets, property, equality, labor, and wealth in a manner that "fails to disturb those enjoying economic and political power" ("*Soruşturma: İslam'da İhtiyaç Fazlası Malın Sınırı Nedir?*" 2011). By contrast, he understands the Qur'anic injunction for social justice as a redistributive command (Eliaçık 2011d). He suggests that charitable giving, mutual care, and a compassion for others are key aspects of the Islamic faith. It is Eliaçık's conviction that this "altruistic culture" is at risk of being destroyed by liberal capitalism. By eroding social bonds, emphasizing individual values, and undermining community-based relations, liberal capitalism seeks to transform Muslims into "individuals" enchained to financial banks and overwhelmed by credit card debt (Eliaçık 2014). By warning against the destructive impact of Western capitalism, Eliaçık invites Muslims to revive a truly Islamic socio-economic structure that is driven not by competition and greed, but rather by an ethics of care. Islam, Eliaçık argues, is neither a religion of the poor nor of the wealthy, but one that ordains the wealthy to be cognizant of the fact that their worldly possessions belong to Allah (2015, 158). All Muslims are expected to give away, not just some of their possessions, but any amount that exceeds their need.⁴ Most of a Muslim's earnings, possessions, and wealth should thus be given away freely. The purpose is not to bless one's wealth or feel better about one's own self. Muslims, rather, need to be aware of their own privilege and constantly work to ameliorate class-based differences in their own society. This division, according to Eliaçık, results from the downfall of the classless unitary society (*ümmet'i vahide*) of early Islam (Eliaçık 2015, 46).

Eliaçık's call for restoring Islamic justice is closely linked to his interpretation of the role of property in a Muslim's life. He emphasizes the idea that in Islam, all property belongs to Allah (Eliaçık 2006). The concept of *Lehü'l Mülk* (*Mülk Allahındır*) points to a unique understanding of property based on collective ownership instead of individual property rights. Eliaçık suggests that only a collectivist understanding of property can act as an antidote to capitalism (2005; 2011c). In his view, property in Islamic cosmology refers to the totality of wealth, power, and information that may put some individuals in a more advantageous position vis-à-vis others (Eliaçık 2015, 46). He is not specifically against the acquisition of

⁴ Author's interview with İhsan Eliaçık, August 2, 2017, Istanbul.

property; rather, he is critical of the tendency towards hoarding wealth, power, and information among Muslims in Turkey, which is why a recurring theme of his writings concerns the relationship between the haves and the have-nots (Eliaçık 2015, 17).

Due to his emphasis on social justice and economic equality, Eliaçık is sometimes referred to as an “Islamic-socialist” (Karakoç 2012) or an “Islam-Marxist” (Akyol 2013). Although he plays a pioneering role in the formulation of a “Muslim-left” school of thought in Turkey, he does so by repudiating Marxism as well as socialism. Instead, Eliaçık emphasizes that Islam provides a third way of organizing economic relations, thus presenting an alternative to both capitalism and communism (Eliaçık 2016, 196–99). Although he finds some aspects of Marxism similar to his understanding of “social Islam,” he argues that the Islamic critique of capitalism is superior to that of Marxism because of the formers’ focus on the “psychological-metaphysical” dimensions of human-economy relations (Eliaçık 2011c, 23). But while Eliaçık finds Marx to be restrictive due to Marx’s materialist and “political-economic” reading of Western capitalist development, he also suggests that, as long as it is reinterpreted in light of Islamic philosophical traditions, Marxist theory might provide a useful reference point for establishing social justice (Eliaçık 2016, 304).

His suggestion to situate Marx within an Islamic perspective while rejecting the universality of Marxism illustrates how Eliaçık positions himself vis-à-vis Western political and economic theory. Unlike Özel, who claims that Western economic practices originated from Islam and were later adopted by Europeans, and unlike Bergen, who argues that European theories of modernity are inapplicable to non-Western contexts such as Turkey, Eliaçık occupies a theoretical middle ground between universalism and particularism. On the one hand, he engages with concepts, theorists, and philosophies from the West as well as the East. For instance, in many of his writings, he employs insights from a wide range of classical and modern thinkers and does so without issuing blanket endorsements that refer to a thinkers’ “civilizational” location. On the other hand, his engagement with these thinkers occurs within an Islam-centric worldview, which sees the Qur’an as the basis of universal knowledge. As a living document, the Qur’an provides guidelines for all humanity, but this knowledge is more accessible to Muslims (Eliaçık 2014). Understanding the true teachings of their faith and the call for justice, Eliaçık suggests, is the path towards solving economic problems such as inequality, unemployment, and poverty as well as corruption, oppression, and tyranny.

BERGEN'S PASTORAL ISLAM AND LONGING FOR A COMMUNITY-BASED ECONOMY

Born in 1964, Lütfi Bergen was trained as a lawyer but spent most of his life as a self-employed researcher-journalist. Although he regularly gives talks at workshops organized by Islamic NGOs, think-tanks, and municipalities and is thus a key figure of the Islamic intellectual field in Turkey, he avoids activist movements as much as he declines governmental favors. He attributes his “marginal stance” to his unusual background: “I grew up in a leftist family, reading Marxist and socialist authors. But I had a crisis in my twenties, and that’s when I turned to religion and started reading about Turkish culture and Islamic history.”⁵ This period of enlightenment culminated in the publication of Bergen’s first book: “The Preeminence of Underdevelopment” (*Az gelişmişlik Üstünlüktür*) in 1995. In this book, Bergen accused the Islamist movement in Turkey with embracing the Western logic of modernist developmentalism and submitting to the maxim of civilizational progress. As he put it, “Islamists have failed to change the dominant structure, instead they became part of it.”⁶ Due to the scathing nature of his criticisms, he was excluded from Islamist circles and was unable to find opportunities to distribute his work. But after a decade-long hiatus, he began sharing his ideas in a personal blog and gradually started to write in mainstream Islamic outlets such as *Hece* and *Yolcu* as well as more left-leaning Islamic platforms, including *Emek ve Adalet* and *İştiraki*. He also published several books, including *City-Islam and Capitalism: Let’s March to Urban Centers*, *The West is Collapsing* (Bergen 2014a), *The Rights of Subjects: A Treatise on Law and Justice* (Bergen 2017), and *A Moral Revolution* (Bergen 2020).

In very broad brushstrokes, Bergen can be described as a conservative intellectual who advocates for a return to the economic, social, cultural, religious, and political structure of pre-industrialism. On the one hand, following Turkish intellectual Nurettin Topçu’s (1905–1975) nationalist ideology that combined Islamic socialism and corporatism, Bergen positions himself as an intellectual of the “Anatolian-left” (Bergen 2014c). On the other hand, Bergen has an intellectual affinity towards al-Farabi’s Islamic philosophy, which according to Bergen provides a guideline for establishing a virtuous city-society (*fazıl toplum*) (Bergen 2016). In addition, he believes that there exists an irreconcilable difference between Western and Islamic civilizations (Bergen 2013). For him, this difference is not a problem to be fixed but rather

⁵ Author’s interview with Lütfi Bergen, July 19, 2017, Ankara.

⁶ Author’s interview with Lütfi Bergen, July 19, 2017, Ankara.

a call towards understanding, cherishing, and reviving Turkey's rich civilizational heritage. For this reason, he devotes considerable energy towards using "indigenous" (*bize has*) theoretical concepts either by clarifying their true meaning according to Islam or by refusing to use terms that, he believes, have originated from the West such as "human rights" or "civil society" (Bergen 2014a, 80).

According to Bergen, Islam dictates an economic system in which the family unit—not free-standing individuals—engages in production and consumption. These economic activities are embedded within society, and there is no distinction between a family's social, religious, or commercial interests, all forms of exchange occur seamlessly within an organic whole (Bergen 2017, 232). He argues that the destructive impact of modernization, industrialization, and urbanization has removed Muslims from their true civilizational essence. For him, civilizational awareness and justice are inextricably linked in that they compel the cultivation of moral virtues in each segment of society.

Bergen argues that the Turkish-Islamic civilization is distinctive because it achieves a just economy through the cultivation of an ethical stance. He deems the quest for a virtuous society more important than a search for social or economic justice (Bergen 2014b). In his view, a just society can only be achieved if Muslims live and act according to a vision of Islamic virtue. In developing this position, Bergen reimagines a pastoral version of a Muslim society that he, somewhat eclectically, locates in a wide range of geographical and historical referents, including Huns, Seljuks, and Ottomans as well as Central Asian Turkic groups. These societies, Bergen argues, are defined by a layered social-economic structure that organizes people according to their occupations: farmers, craftsmen, soldiers, and traders. As a result, these stratified societies are integrated through an organic relationship forged between religious brotherhoods, foundations, dwellings, bazaars and family-units that fulfill different economic functions.

Unsurprisingly, Bergen disagrees with Özel's interpretation of what constitutes a just economy. Bergen argues that the Muslim bazaar is not akin to Western notions of the free market and should not be conflated with the "entrepreneurial spirit of the rising Muslim bourgeoisie" (2017, 235). Bergen instead suggests that Muslims have what he terms as the "right to the bazaar." For him, the "right to the bazaar" means that any Muslim family-unit can exchange their goods in the marketplace. But this form of trade and commerce occurs within a communal economic system in which the concept of individual property rights is absent. Yet, today, Bergen argues, most Muslims believe that economic

freedom only means that an individual has a right to exchange his labor for money:

Muslims have forgotten the “right to the bazaar” notion, have transformed work into labor, and have thus subverted the Islamic economy with a capitalist mentality. As a result, Muslims lost an understanding of the Islamic bazaar that rejects exploitation, colonization and human servitude. (Bergen 2017, 232)

For Bergen, Islam provides not only an alternative economic system, but also a fundamentally different way of thinking about human nature and the bonds between people and things. On the question of ownership, for example, he explains that since Allah owns all property, Muslims cannot form mediocre and temporary relationships with their possessions. This moral principle of relating to artifacts, belongings, and commodities at a spiritual level contradicts Western consumer culture, which presents goods as disposable.⁷ Bergen also suggests that concepts such as “class,” “workers’ rights,” or “business-labor relations” are not meaningful within an Islamic understanding of labor and justice, which sees humans as community-based crafts people instead of free-floating workers who merely seek employment that pays well (2017, 231–32).

Bergen also criticizes other Muslim intellectuals for misunderstanding the essence of justice according to Islam (2011). In this perspective, by using the Western prism of equality, Muslim intellectuals fail to understand that Islamic notions of justice cannot be marshalled to solve problems created by modernization, industrialization, and urbanization. According to Bergen, justice is about creating a fair balance:

When an animal carries two baskets, it is balanced, one basket might have salt, the other might have sugar, they are not equal, they are not the same, but there is an order that creates a balance. The goal here is not to make sure everyone owns the same amount of sugar or the same amount of salt. Islam does not have such a plain concept of justice.⁸

A just economy, according to Bergen, therefore can only be realized in pre-modern, pre-industrial times. Used in this context, justice does not entail equality, but a sense of fairness that corresponds to one’s location in the stratified socio-economic structure.

⁷ Author’s interview with Lütfi Bergen, July 19, 2017, Ankara.

⁸ Author’s interview with Lütfi Bergen, July 19, 2017, Ankara.

CONCLUSION

As this article has demonstrated, Muslim intellectuals in Turkey discuss economic problems primarily through debating the meaning and purpose of Islamic justice. Although these individuals are key figures of the Islamic intellectual field in Turkey, they offer strikingly different problematizations and interpretations. One locates the origins of free market capitalism in early Islamic society (Özel), another claims that personal wealth should be kept at a minimum through comprehensive programs of social redistribution (Eliçak), while yet another advocates for a return to a craft-based, household economy (Bergen). Through their disagreements, these thinkers are actively debating globally resonant issues with everything such an engagement entails in terms of the productive encounters between global versus local, Western versus Eastern, and foreign versus Islamic sources. The contrasting accounts of the “just economy” put forth by these intellectuals thus speaks to the complexity of religious interpretations and economic visions in non-Western and non-Christian contexts while also demonstrating that the relationship between religion and neoliberalism cannot be understood without paying attention to the dynamic production of local knowledge.

REFERENCES

- Aishima, Hatsuki. 2016. *Public Culture and Islam in Modern Egypt: Media, Intellectuals and Society*. London: I. B. Tauris.
- Akyol, Mustafa. 2006. “Kavganın Yerine Düşünce.” *Radikal*, February 3, 2006. Available at: <http://www.radikal.com.tr/yorum/kavganin-yerine-dusunce-770655/>. Accessed on January 20, 2020.
- . 2013. “Why Turkey Has ‘Anti-Capitalist Muslims.’” *Al-Monitor*, July 17, 2013. Available at <https://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/originals/2013/07/turkey-anti-capitalist-muslims-gezi-social-justice-activism.html>. Accessed on March 18, 2021.
- Altun, Fahrettin. 2006. “Müslüman Kapitalist Olur Mu?” *Anlayış*, no. 33 (February): 24–28.
- Arat, Yeşim. 2013. “Violence, Resistance, and Gezi Park.” *International Journal of Middle East Studies* 45 (4): 807–9.
- Asad, Talal. 1986. *The Idea of an Anthropology of Islam*. Washington, DC: Georgetown University, Center for Contemporary Arab Studies (Occasional Paper Series).
- Atia, Mona. 2013. *Building a House in Heaven: Pious Neoliberalism and Islamic Charity in Egypt*. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press.

Aytürk, İlker, and Laurent Mignon. 2013. "Paradoxes of a Cold War Sufi Woman: Samiha Ayverdi between Islam, Nationalism, and Modernity." *New Perspectives on Turkey* 49: 57–89.

Bergen, Lütfi. 1995. *Az gelişmişlik Üstünlüktür*. İstanbul: Yazıgen.

—. 2011. "Adalet Dairesi." *Haber portalı. Habername*, March 27, 2011. Available at <http://www.habername.com/yazi-lutfi-bergen-adalet-dairesi-6563.htm>. Accessed on November 30, 2020.

—. 2013. "Ferdin Dini İslâm – Toplumun Dindarlığı Medeniyet – İslâm Medeniyetinin Doğuşu." *Hece XVII* (198–200): 44–50.

—. 2014a. *Kent-İslam ve Kapitalizm: Şehre Yürüyelim BATI Yıkılacak*. İstanbul: Doğu Kitabevi.

—. 2014b. *Lütfi Bergen: "Ahlak Adaletten Önce Gelir."* Available at <http://www.emekveadalet.org/soylesiler/lutfi-bergen-ahlak-adaletten-once-gelir/>. Accessed on September 20, 2020.

—. 2014c. "Anadolusol." September 2, 2014. Available at <http://lutfibergen.blogspot.com/2014/09/anadolusol.html>. Accessed on October 23, 2020.

—. 2016. "Farabi ve Şehir." *Adalet Davet*, April 7, 2016. Available at <https://www.adaletdavet.com/farabi-ve-sehir>. Accessed on October 18, 2020.

—. 2017. *Kul Hakları Hukuk ve Adalet Tasavvuru İçin Deneme*. İstanbul: Yazıgen.

—. 2020. *Ahlak Ayıklanması*. İstanbul: Yazıgen.

Bilefsky, Dan. 2006. "Turks Knock on Europe's Door with Evidence that Islam and Capitalism Can Coexist." *The New York Times*, August 27, 2006. Available at <https://www.nytimes.com/2006/08/27/world/europe/27turkey.html>. Accessed on August 20, 2020.

Bourdieu, Pierre. 1969. "Intellectual Field and the Creative Project." *Social Science Information* 8 (2): 89–119.

Brady, Michelle, and Randy K. Lippert. 2016. *Governing Practices: Neoliberalism, Governmentality, and the Ethnographic Imaginary*. Toronto: University of Toronto Press.

Bulaç, Ali. 2006. "İslam Kalvinistleri." *Zaman*, January 27, 2006. Available at <https://fgulen.com/tr/basindan-tr/kose-yazilari/Ali-Bulac-Zaman-Islam-Kalvinistleri>. Accessed on August 1, 2020.

Çınar, Alev. 2019a. "İslamcı Dergilerde Siyasal Düşüncenin Üretimi: Siyasal Kuram-İslami Düşünce İlişkisi." In *1980 Sonrası İslamcı Dergilerde Meseleler, Kavramlar ve İsimler*, edited by Lütfi Sunar, 2: Tarih, Siyaset, İktisat:183–211. Konya, Turkey: Konya Büyükşehir Belediyesi.

———. 2019b. “Negotiating the Foundations of the Modern State: The Emasculated Citizen and the Call for a Post-Patriarchal State at Gezi Protests.” *Theory and Society* 48 (3): 453–82.

Dagi, Ihsan. 2004. “Rethinking Human Rights, Democracy, and the West: Post-Islamist Intellectuals in Turkey.” *Critique: Critical Middle Eastern Studies* 13 (2): 135–51.

Dalacoura, Katerina. 2017. “A New Phase in Turkish Foreign Policy: Expediency and AKP Survival.” *MENARA Future Notes* 4. Available at <http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/69619/>. Accessed on December 11, 2020.

Dorroll, Philip. 2014. “‘The Turkish Understanding of Religion’: Rethinking Tradition and Modernity in Contemporary Turkish Islamic Thought.” *Journal of the American Academy of Religion* 82 (4): 1033–69.

Eliacık, İhsan. 1998. “Adalet Devleti II - Kavramsal Bir Tasarım.” *Değişim*, no. 61 (December): 29–33.

———. 2005. “Kapitalizmin Panzehiri; Lehu’l-Mülk.” *Yarım*, no. 33 (January): 50–52.

———. 2006. “Asr Suresinde Kurtuluş Teolojisi.” *Yarım*, no. 48 (April): 32–35.

———. 2011a. *Adalet Devleti: Ortak İyinin İktidarı, Tarih Boyunca Din-Devlet Düşüncesi ve Yeni Devlet Anlayışı*. İstanbul: İnşa Yayınları.

———. 2011b. “Firavun’u Tanıyalım.” In *İslam ve Kapitalizm: Medine’den İnsanlığa*, ed. İhsan Eliacık et al., 11–21. İstanbul: Doğu Kitabevi.

———. 2011c. “Kapitalizmin Panzehiri.” In *İslam ve Kapitalizm: Medine’den İnsanlığa*, ed. İhsan Eliacık et al., 21–33. İstanbul: Doğu Kitabevi.

———. 2011d. “Kuran’da Eşitlik ve Sosyal Adalet.” *Emek ve Adalet Platformu*. May 19, 2011. Available at <http://www.emekveadalet.org/faaliyetler/kuran%e2%80%99da-esitlik-ve-sosyal-adalet-ihsan-eliacik/>. Accessed on February 30, 2021

———. 2014. *Yaşayan Kur’an: Nuzül Sırasına Göre Türkçe Meal-Tefsir*. İstanbul: İnşa Yayınları.

———. 2015. *Sosyal İslam Dinin Direği Paylaşımıdır*. İstanbul: Tekin Yayınevi.

———. 2016. *Mülk Yazıları: Göklerde ve Yerlerde Mülkiyet Allah’a Aittir*. İstanbul: İnşa Yayınları.

Fugard, A., and H. W. Potts. 2019. “Thematic Analysis.” In *SAGE Research Methods*, edited by P. Atkinson, S. Delamont, A. Cernat, J.W. Sakshaug, and R. A. Williams. London: Sage Publications.

Higgins, Vaughan, and Wendy Larner. 2017. *Assembling Neoliberalism: Expertise, Practices, Subjects*. New York: Palgrave Macmillan.

- Hoffman, Lisa, Monica DeHart, and Stephen J. Collier. 2006. "Notes on the Anthropology of Neoliberalism." *Anthropology News* 47 (6): 9–10.
- "Islamic Calvinists. Change and Conservatism in Central Anatolia." 2005. Berlin-Istanbul: European Stability Initiative. Available at: https://www.esiweb.org/sites/default/files/reports/pdf/Islamic_Calvinists_-_19_September_2005.pdf. Accessed on February 10, 2020.
- Karakoç, Bekir. 2012. "İhsan Eliaçık ve (Yeni) İslâmi Sosyalizm." *Umran*, no. 215 (July): 103–113.
- Karasipahi, Sena. 2009. *Muslims in Modern Turkey: Kemalism, Modernism and the Revolt of the Islamic Intellectuals*. London & New York: I.B. Tauris.
- Kentel, Ferhat. 2005. "1990'ların İslami Düşünce Dergileri ve Yeni Müslüman Entellektüeller: Bilgi ve Hikmet, Umran, Tezkire Dergileri." In *Modern Türkiye'de Siyasi Düşünce Cilt 6: İslamcılık*, edited by Yasin Aktay, 721–98. Istanbul: İletişim Yayınları.
- Kersten, Carol. 2011. *Cosmopolitans and Heretics: New Muslim Intellectuals and the Study of Islam*. London: Hurst & Company.
- Khosrokhavar, Farhad. 2004. "The New Intellectuals in Iran." *Social Compass* 51 (2): 191–202.
- Kingfisher, Catherine, and Jeff Maskovsky. 2008. "Introduction: The Limits of Neoliberalism." *Critique of Anthropology* 28 (2): 115–26.
- Koca, Bayram. 2018. "The Emergence of Anti-Capitalist Muslims in Turkey: 'God, Bread, Freedom.'" In *Muslims and Capitalism: An Uneasy Relationship*, edited by Beatrice Hendrich, 135–50. Köln: Ergon-Verlag.
- Köseoğlu, Talha. 2019. "Islamists and the State: Changing Discourses on the State, Civil Society and Democracy in Turkey." *Turkish Studies* 20 (3): 323–50.
- Lord, Ceren. 2018. *Religious Politics in Turkey: From the Birth of the Republic to the AKP*. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.
- Mittermaier, Amira. 2014. "Beyond Compassion: Islamic Voluntarism in Egypt." *American Ethnologist* 41 (3): 518–31.
- Özel, Mustafa. 1993. "Dünya Sistemi ve Müslümanlar." *Umran* 11 (January-February): 32–36.
- . 1994. "Adam Zengin Olur Mu?" In *İş Hayatında İslam İnsanı (Homo Islamicus): İslami Duyarlılıkla Yönetilen Firmalarda Örgütsel Davranış Biçimleri*, edited by Hüner Şencan, 3–14. Istanbul: MÜSİAD.
- . 1996a. "Ekonomi Modern Dünyanın Dinidir." *İzlenim* 40 (December): 37–41.

- . 1996b. “İktisat, Fiyat ve Adalet Üzerine.” *Divan* 1:147–158.
- . 2002. “Din, Piyasa ve Kapitalizm.” *Piyasa* 1:23–28.
- . 2005. “İslami Liberalizm, BOP ve Tarih Bilinci.” *Anlayış* 25 (June): 22–25.
- . 2006. “Din, Ticaret ve Çok Ortaklı Şirketler.” *Anlayış* 43 (December): 18–22.
- . 2010a. “‘Solcu’ Olmanın Vaktidir!” *Anlayış* 81 (February): 16–20.
- . 2010b. “Medine Pazarı’ndan MÜSİAD’a.” *Anlayış* 83 (April): 16–20.
- . 2019. “*Kapitalizmin Alternatifi Adalet ve Kanaattır.*” Available at <https://www.ekrangazetesi.com/haber/15868/mustafa-ozel-kapitalizmin-alternatifi-adalet-ve-kanaattir.html>. Accessed on March 21, 2021.
- Rudnyckyj, Daromir. 2018. *Beyond Debt: Islamic Experiments in Global Finance*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
- Sloane-White, Patricia. 2017. *Corporate Islam: Sharia and the Modern Workplace*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- “Soruşturma: İslam’da İhtiyaç Fazlası Malın Sınırı Nedir?” 2011. *Emek ve Adalet Platformu*. June 24, 2011. Available at <https://www.emekveadalet.org/islam-iktisadi/islamda-ihiyac-fazlasi-malin-siniri-nedir-hayrettin-karaman-ihsan-eliacik-mustafa-islamoglu-hayri-kirbasoglu-ve-ali-bulac/>. Accessed on April 21, 2021.
- Sunar, Lütfi. 2018. “*Türkiye’de İslami STK’ların Kurumsal Yapı ve Faaliyetlerinin Değişimi.*” İstanbul: Kurumsal Yönetim Akademisi Araştırma Raporları.
- Taji-Farouki, Suha. 2004. *Modern Muslim Intellectuals and the Qur’an*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Tobin, Sarah A. 2016. *Everyday Piety: Islam and Economy in Jordan*. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press.
- Tripp, Charles. 2006. *Islam and the Moral Economy: The Challenge of Capitalism*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Tuğal, Cihan. 2009. *Passive Revolution: Absorbing the Islamic Challenge to Capitalism*. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press.
- . 2017. *Caring for the Poor: Islamic and Christian Benevolence in a Liberal World*. London: Routledge.
- Turam, Berna. 2007. *Between Islam and the State; The Politics of Engagement*. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press.
- Uestebay, Leor. 2019. “Between ‘Tradition’ and Movement: The Emergence of Turkey’s Anti-Capitalist Muslims in the Age of Protest.” *Globalizations* 16 (4): 472–88.

Uzun, Güney. 2006. "Kapitalizm Karşısında Savrulma Örnekleri." *Haksöz* 186 (September): 22–34.

Yildiz, Ahmet. 2006. "Transformation of Islamic Thought in Turkey Since the 1950s." In *The Blackwell Companion to Contemporary Islamic Thought*, edited by Ibrahim M. Abu-Rabi, 39–55. Oxford: Wiley-Blackwell.

Zencirci, Gizem. 2020. "Markets of Islam: Performative Charity and the Muslim Middle Classes in Turkey." *Journal of Cultural Economy* 13 (5): 610–25.